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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;:
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIATION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY
PUMPERS I INC. I

SUPREME COURT CASE NO.
16891
P.S.C.U. CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

76-023-04

-vsPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Corrunissioner; and.DAVID R. IRVINE,
Commissioner,
Defendants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants seek refund of the amount of the increase in
rates for the period February 18, 1977 through May 23, 1978,
granted C.P. National Corporation (an electric utility) pursuant
to a February 18, 1977, order of the Public Service Com.mission
which was subsequently reversed and remanded by the Utah Supreme
Court on December 5, 1978.

(Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. v. Public

Service Com'n., 586 P.2d 407)
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DISPOSITION BEFORE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The Public Service Commission denied the requested refund.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order of this court requiring the
Public Service Commission to determine the amount of the refund
and to require c.P. National Corporation to refund said amount
to the persons entitled thereto as required by Section 54-7-17(4),
U.C.A. 1953.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In case no. 76-023-04 before the Public Service Commission,
C.P. National Corporation (then California Pacific Utilities,
hereinafter "C.P.", real party in interest herein) applied for
an increase in the rates charged to its customers to recover,
inter alia, annual rental expenses for a transmission line owned
by Utah Power and Light Company.

The transmission line had been

constructed by Utah Power and Light Company and part of its
capacity was to be used by C.P. to transmit power purchased from
Utah Power and Light Company to C.P.'s customers.

The line was

constructed at an approximate cost of $4,400,000.

The rental

contract

provided that C.P. pay Utah Power and Light Company

rental expenses of $856,910 per year over a 45 year period.

A reason advanced by respondent for requiring the new transmission line was the obligation of C.P. to wheel power for the
United States Bureau of Reclamation.
The Parowan Pumpers Association appealed the order of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Public Service Commission granting the increase for which refund is
now requested.

A stay of the effect of the order was not obtained,

nor was a "suspending bond" filed with the Supreme court.

In the

decision in that case, this court summarized the facts as follows:
After a number of public hearings on the
proposed rate increase, the Commission found
that both the wheeling agreement and the
UP&L contract were required by law to be
submitted to the Commission for its approval;
that neither contract had been submitted, and
had never been approved; that neither contract
was in the best interest of the public or of
the customers of Cal-Pac; that had Cal-Pac
not been wheeling power for the Bureau the
construction of this new transmission line
would not have been necessary; that the Commission had jurisdiction over the rates , .
charged for all intrastate utilities including
the wheeling rates; and that the Commission
had the power to modify or amend the contracts.
In its order, the Commission nevertheless
granted 53.03% of the requested increase and
ordered Cal-Pac to negotiate with the Bureau
for an increase in the wheeling rate.
The Commission's order is not supported
by its findings, and in fact is hostile to
them.
The findings and order are irreconcilable and that irreconcilability is fatal.
The Commission found that the UP&L contract
was not in the public interest but based a
rate increase on the terms of that contract.
The Commission found that the construction
of the transmission line was not a necessary·
expenditure for the purpose of supplying
service to the customers of Cal-Pac but
granted an increase which requires those
customers to pay 53% of the cost of that
construction. Also there is no finding that
the increase granted is reasonable; on the
contrary, the implication of the findings is
that the incr~ase is not reasonable.
As we are unable to correlate the findings with the commission's order, we reverse
and remand the case to the Commission to take
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such action, including further hearings, if
necessary, as it deems advisable for the
purpose of achieving a harmonious relationship between its findings and order.
(Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. v. Public Service Com'n.,
586 P.2d 407)
Upon remand, both the Parowan Pumpers Ass'n. and the Cornmittee of Consumer Services (Appellants) petitioned the Public
service Commission for an order requiring C.P. to refund to its
Utah jurisdiction customers an amount equal to the new revenue
collected from those customers pursuant to the reversed order of
February 18, 1977.

The period subject to the requested refund

extends from February 18, 1977 to May 23, 1978, the date on which
a new order establishing rates for respondent's Utah customers
was entered.in case no. 77-023-08.

(R-123)

After consolidating case no. 76-023-04 with cases 77-023-05
and 77-023-08, the Public Service Commission proceeded to hear
evidence on some of the issues presented in those cases.
Thereafter, the Commission entered its "Supplemental Report
and Order' dated January 11, 1980, in case no. 76-023-04.

In this

"Supplemental Report and Order' the Commission determined that its
reversed Order of February 18, 1977, "was inartfully drawn and was
hastily issued under the pressures of a heavy caseload of hearings
and paper work."

(R-124, para. 4 of Findings of Fact)

Having previously entered a finding that the rental expense
contract ~ not in the public interest, the Public Service commis·
sion in its "Supplemental Report and Order" made a finding that
the rental expense contract was in the public interest.
para. 5 of Findings of Fact)
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(R-124,

Based on this finding, the Commission "amended" its reversed
order of February 18, 1977, "consistent" with its new finding that
the rental expense contract was in the public interest.
Conclusions of Law).

(R-125,

The rates established by the "amended" re-

versed order were then affirmed and the petition for refund was
(R-125, 126, of the Order).

denied.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED FOR REFUND
TO CUSTOMERS OF REVENUES COLLECTED BY A
PUBLIC UTILITY PURSUANT TO AN INVALID ORDER
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.

It is the contention of appellants that the Public Service
Commission by state law had no alternative but to order a refund
of revenues collected by C.P. pursuant to an order which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.
Section 54-7-17, U.C~A. 1953~ specifically provides that
revenues collected by a public utility under authority of an invalid order of the Public Service Commission are to be refunded
to the customers from whom they are collected.

This, and Section

54-7-16 U.C.A. 1953, set forth the mechanics of obtaining such a
refund.

Application is made to the Supreme Court for a writ of

certiorari (54-7-16).

Pending the determination of the writ, the

Supreme Court may stay or suspend the appealed order and may require that the disputed revenues be impounded by the court or
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-5-

placed in a bank or trust company.

When the Supreme Court has

made its final decision (and in the event the appeal is successful
the monies collected by the public utility under authority of the
invalid order, together with interest if the disputed funds have
been impounded in a bank or trust company, are to be refunded by
order of the Public Service Commission to the persons from whom
they were collected.
The pertinent provisions contained in the indicated subsections of Section 54-7-17 are as follows

(we reprinted the entire

Section 54-7-17 for the convenience of the court at the end-of
the argument on this Section) :
(1) The pendency of a writ of review shall not
of itself stay or suspend the operation of the
order or decision of the commission, .
(1) during the pendency of such a writ the Supreme
Court in its discretion may stay or suspend, in
whole or in part, __ the oper_ation of the cornmission' s order.
(2) the order suspending the same shall contain
a specific finding . . . that great or irreparable damage would otherwise result to the
petitioner.
(3) In case the order or decision of the commission is stayed or suspended, the order of the
court shall not become effective until a suspending bond shall first have been executed and
filed . .
(3)
The Supreme Court, in case it stays or suspends the order or decision of the commission in
any matter affecting rates, fares, tolls, rentals,
c~arges or classifications, shall also by order
direct the public utility affected to pay into
court from time to time, there to be impounded
until the final decision of the case, or into
some bank or trust company paying interest on
deposits, under such conditions as the court may
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prescribe, all sums of money which it may
collect from any person in excess of the sum
~uch person would have been compelled to pay,
if the order or decision of the commission
had not been stayed or suspended.
(4) Upon the final decision by the Supreme
Court, all monies which the public utility
may have collected pending the appeal in excess of those authorized by such final decision
together with interest in case the court
ordered the deposit of such monies in a bank
or trust company, shall be promptly paid to the
persons entitled thereto in such manner and
through such methods of distribution as may be
described by the commission.
(emphasis added)
Section 54-7-17 makes it obligatory that a refund be ordered
in this matter.

An order of the Public Service Commission author-

izing an increase in rates was "reversed" by the Supreme Court.
Revenues collected by C.P. pursuant to that invalid order should
be "promptly paid to the persons entitled thereto in such manner
and through such methods of distribution as may be described by
the commission."

On remand, the Public Service Commission com-

mitted error in failing to comply with the requirements of this
subsection (4) of Section 54-7-17.

The entire text of Section

54-7-17 is as follows:
Stay

pending~Conditions~Procedure~

Bond~Reparations.~

(1)
The pendency of a writ
of review shall not of itself stay or suspend
the operation of the order or decision of the
commission, but during the pendency of such writ
the Supreme Court in its discretion may stay or
suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of
the commission's order or decision.

(2)
No order so staying or suspending an
order or decision of the commission shall be
made by the Supreme Court otherwise than upon
three days' notice ,and after hearing, and, if
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the order or decision of the commission is
suspended, the order suspending the same
shall contain a specific finding, based upon
evidence submitted to the court and identified
by reference thereto, that great or irrepar-_
able damage would otherwise result to the
petitioner, and specifying the nature of the
damage.
(3)
In case the order or decision of the
commission is stayed or suspended, the order of
the court shall not become effective until a
suspending bond shall first have been executed
and filed with and approved by the commission
(or approved, on review, by the Supreme Court)
payable to the state of Utah, and sufficient
in amount and security to ensure the prompt
payment by the party petitioning for the review
of all damages caused by the delay in the enforcement of the order or decision of the
commission, and of all moneys which any person
or corporation may be compelled to pay, pending
the review proceedings, for transportation,
transmission, product, commodity or service in
excess of the charges fixed by the order or
decision of the commission, in case said order
or decision is sustained. The Supreme Court,
in case it stays or suspends the order or decision of the commission in any matter affecting
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or
classifications, shall also by order direct the
public utility affected to pay into court from
time to time, there to be impounded until the
final decision of the case, or into some bank
or trust company paying interest on deposits,
under such conditions as the court may prescribe,
all sums of money which it may collect from any
person in excess of the sum such person would
have been compelled to pay, if the order or
decision of the commission had not been stayed
or suspended.
(4)
In case the Supreme Court stays or suspends any order or decision lowering any rate,
fare, toll, rental, charge or classification,
the commission upon the execution and approval of
such suspending bond shall forthwith require the
public utility affected, under penalty of the
immediate enforcement of the order or decision
of the commission pending the review and notwithstanding the suspending order, to keep such

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_o_

accounts, v~rified by oath, as may in the judgment of the commission suffice to show the
amounts being charged or received by such public
utility pending the review in excess of the
charges allowed by the order or decision of the
commission, together with the names and addresses
of the persons to whom overcharges will be refundable, in case the charges made by the public
utility pending the review are not sustained by
the Supreme Court.
The court may from time to
time require such party petitioning for a review
to give additional security or to increase the
said suspending bond whenever in the opinion of
the court the same may be necessary to ensure the
prompt payment of such damages and such overcharges. Upon the final decision by the Supreme
Court all moneys which the public utility may
have collected pending the appeal in excess of
those authorized by such final decision, together
with interest in case the court ordered the deposit of such moneys in a bank or trust company,
shall be promptly paid to the persons entitled
thereto in such manner and through such methods
of distribution as may be prescribed by the
commission.
If any such moneys shall not have
been claimed by the persons entitled thereto
within one year from the final decision of the
Supreme Court, the commission shall cause notice
to such persons to be given by publication, once
a week for two successive weeks, in a newspaper
of general circulation printed and published in
the city and county of Salt Lake, and in such other
newspaper or newspapers as may be designated by
the commission; said notice to state the names of
the persons entitled to such moneys and the amount
due each person. All moneys not claimed within
three months after the publication of such notice
shall be paid by the public utility under the
direction of the commission into the state treasury
for the benefit of the general fund.
(parts
underlined are those quoted above)
POINT II.
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT "REVERSING AND REMANDING" THE ORDER OF THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION WAS A "FINAL DECISION"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 54-7-17(4)
Appellants contend that the decision of this court of
December 5, 1978, reversing the order of the Public Service Commission of February 18, 1977, was a "final decision" as contemplated
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by section 54-7-17(4), and required the conunission to make a refunc
to customers of C.P. of revenues collected pursuant to that
reversed order.
As set forth above, Section 54-7-17(4) provides for a
refund of utility revenues collected pursuant to an invalid order
of the Public Service Commission.

This refund is to be made "upon

the final decision by the Supreme Court."

The meaning of the

term "final decision" in that statute has been construed by this
court in the cases of Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public S. Com'n.,
142 P.2d 873, and Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Service Commission, 155 P.2d 184, to mean the opinion by the Supreme Court on
the writ of review and not the decision of the entire controversy.
In the first Mt. States Tel. & Tel. case, the Public Service
Commission had entered an order

reducing toll rates.

Mt. States

appealed, filed a petition for a stay of the commission's order.
and posted the required bond.
States were impounded.

All disputed sums collected by Mt.

On appeal, the court said:

The order of the Commission must be set
aside and the matter remanded to the Commission for a determination as to what would be
a reasonable and just rate for intrastate toll
service.
(Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Public Ser.
Com'n., 142 P.2d 873)
On remand, Mt. States requested that the Commission release
to

~t.

States the monies in the impounded fund.

In answer, the

commission contended that the court had merely set aside the commission's order and sent the case back to it for further consideration and proceedings, that any further hearing was merely a continuation of the original case, and that there had been no "final
decision" within the purview of Section 76-6-17 U.C.A. 1943 (now
Sponsored by the
S.J. Quinney1953).
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The refusal of the Commission to release the impounded
fund led to the second Mt. States Tel. & Tel. case.

The precise

issue was the meaning of "final decision" in the refund statute.
In holding that "final decision" referred to the decision of the
Supreme Court on the writ of review, only, and not to the determination of the entire controversy, the court was addressing a
situation in which the utility was appealing and had obtained
the impounding of funds.
is pertinent.

However, its interpretation of the law

It said:

(8) If the foregoing analysis of the statute
be valid, then any contention to the effect
that the provision in subsection (3) of Sec.
76-6-17 that the money be "impounded until
the final decision of the case," means that
it be held until the final decision of the
controversy must fail.
It is clear to us
beyond doubt that such words mean until the
final decision of the supreme court. The
words"final decision of the case" themselves
mean, without any contextual modification,
the case in the supreme court~that case or
proceeding initiated by petition for a writ
of review and concluded by decision of this
court.
(9,10) But the contention is made that this
court did in fact remand the case to the
Commission "for a determination as to what
would be a reasonable and just rate for intrastate toll service" and hence that the case
is not concluded. The remand, however, was
obviously merely formal. Ample authority
exists in the Commission to determine reasonable rates.
The authority comes from.the
legislature not from this court. It must be
clear that we did not thus offhandedly assume
authority which this court has consistently
asserted was not by the legislature conferred
upon it. Nor does the fact that by the provisions of Sec. 76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943, every
unjust and unreasonable charge made by a
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utility for services is prohibited and made
unlawful, confer authority upon this court
to modify an order of the Commission or to
uphold an order in part and set it aside in
part. This for the reason that the determination of whether a rate or charge is
unreasonable or unjust is placed by law in
the Commission and not in the courts.

*

*

*

But in the instant case the question of
the disposition of the fund does not hinge
alone upon the limited power of review of
the order of the Commission. That which
prevents us from holding the fund and subsequently distributing it as equity dictates,
is the explicit mandate of the legislature,
unless it be held that despite such mandate
we may nevertheless exercise such jurisdiction. From the analysis heretofore made
of the statute in question it seems clear
that the legislative intent is:
(1) That
the fund be made up of the amounts collected
by the utility, pending the review, in excess of those fixed by the order of the
Commission under review; (2) that upon decision by this court setting aside or affirming the Commission, no further payments are
to be made into the fund; (3) that the moneys
impounded are to be paid to those entitled
thereto, upon final dicision by this court;
(4) that such moneys are to be refunded to
the rate payer only in case the order or decision of the Commission is affirmed; (5)
that the utility has collected no "overcharge" if the order or decision of the Commission be set aside; (6) that if there be
no "overcharge" there is no fund to distribute.
If such be the legislative intent
then, since in the review proceedings we
set aside the order of the Commission, there
is no fund upon which our equitable powers
may operate.
Nor can there be any question that the
legislature might specifically provide for
disposition of the fund impounded under
ord~r of the court.
It clearly might prescribe that rates fixed by the Commission
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~e

not effec~ive unti~ the period for applying for a ~...-..ri t of review shall expire; or
if petition for such writ be made, until '
final disposition thereof by this court.
There seems no reason, therefore, why it
might not likewise prescribe that a fund
collected upon compliance with a condition
prescribed for a stay be released to the
utility in case the order of the commission
be set aside.
From what has been said it follows that
the fund in quest1on is the property of the
plaintiff, and it is the duty of the Commission to take the necessary steps to release
it. Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed.
(Mt. States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub. Ser. Com'n.,
155 P.2d 184)

In the present matter, the Supreme Court reversed and rernanded the order of the Public Service Commission.

This was a

"final decision" within the meaning of 54-7-17(4) and triggered
the operation of that statute.

The Commission was required to

determine the amount of the refund, the persons to whom refund
should be made, and order that the refunds "be promptly paid to
the persons entitled thereto."
In the present case at hand, it was error for the Commission not to proceed as required by the statute.
POINT III.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CANNOT
IMPOSE RETROACTIVE RATES ON UTILITY
CUSTOMERS.
When the Supreme Court reverses an order of the Public
Service Commission the rates imposed by such order are no longer
valid.

Such rates cannot be reinstated by an amendment purporting

to have retroactive effect.

An attempt to so amend a reversed

order constitutes retroactive rate making.
As set forth under the' Statement of Facts, supra, increased
rates in this matter were authorized by a Public Service CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sion order dated February

18~

1977.

reversed and remanded by this court.

That order was subsequently

The reversed order was there-'/
,;ti

after without legal affect.
The Public Service Commission atempted to give this reversed order retroactive life by amendment.

·,;ij1

It amended its pre-

vious finding that a rental expense contract was not in the public
inte.re~st

to a finding that such contract was in the public interest,

:iH

Having made this amendment, the Commission then reinstated the
rates established by the reversed order as of the date of said
reversed order (February 18, 1977}, and not as of the date of the
purported amendment (January 11, 1980).
Under Utah statutes, the Public Service Commission cannot
impose retroactive rates on utility customers.
February 18, 1977

When the order of

was reversed, the only valid rates which C.P.

could require its customers to pay were those established by the
last valid order setting those rates.

There was no valid order

granting any increase from the date of the reversed order {February
18, 1977) until the date of the next order (May 23, 1978}.
Section 54-4-4(1) requires that a hearing be held prior to
setting rates and that such rates can only have prospective effect.
That Section provides:
Whenever the commission shall find after
a hearing that the rates, . . . charges or
classifications, or any of them demanded,
observed, charged or collected by any public
utility for any service or product or commodity .
. . . are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory
or preferential, or in anyway in violation of
any provisions of law, or that such rates . . .
are insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates
. • • to be thereafter observed and in force
and sh~ll fix the same by order . . • . (emphasis
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The Supreme Court of California (Pac. Tel. & Tel. v.
Pub. Serv. Com., 401 P.2d 353), construing Section 728 of that
state's statutes (and citing numerous decisions from other jurisdictions) held that the use of the word "thereafter" as used in
the Utah statute requires that a rate-making order only have
prospective effect.
A discussion of retroactive rate making is found in the
case of

La. Power & Light v.

La.

Public Service Com'n., 377

So.2d 1023, where the Louisiana court stated:
Pervading the utility rate making process
is the fundamental rule that rates are exclusively prospective in application and that
future rates may not be designed to recoup
past losses.
Transcontinental & Western
Air Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 336 U.S.
601, 69 s.ct. 756, 93 L.Ed. 911(1949); Rhode
Island Consumers' Council v. Smith, 111 R.I.
271, 302 A.2d 757 (1973); Bebchick v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm's, 158
U.S.App.D.C. 79 485 F.2d 858 (1973).
The
rationale of this principle is that the Commission acts in a legislative capacity in
exercising its rate making authority; that
rate making orders have statutory effect; and,
that, as such, they are subject to the rules
ordinarily applied in statutory construction.
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry.,
284 U.S. 370, 52 S .Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932).
The Supreme Court of the United States has
also ruled that to accord a rate order retroactive effect, requires "the clearest mandate".
Claridge Apartments co. v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 141, 65 S.Ct. 172, 89
L.Ed. 139 (1944).
Applicability of the principle of nonretroactivity of rate making orders, has
been considered in numerous jurisdictions
all of which recognize the rule that statutory authority is an indispensable prerequisite
to retroactivity of such orders.
City of
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Miami v. Florida Public Service Conunission, 73
PUR 3d 369 (Fla. 1968); Re City Water Co. of
Chattanooga, 84 PUR 3d 287 (Tenn.Pub.Serv.
comm'n ' 1970); Democratic Central Committee
.
. v.
.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,
141 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 436 F.2d 233 (D.C.Cir.
(1970); New Rochelle Water Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 31 N.Y.2d 397, 340 N.Y.S.2d 617,
292 N.E.2d 767 (1972); New England Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Conunission, 116
R.I. 356, 358 A.2d 1 (1976); New England
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 362 A.2d 741 (Me. 1976).
In a 1972 case, the Supreme Court of California (City of
Los Angeles v. Pub. Ut. Com'n., 497 P.2d 785) discussed a case
containing legal questions similar to these here under discussion.
The court stated:
When the rates set in the ~ecision
before us are annulled, the on y lawful
rates are those which were in existence
prior to the instant decision. We are
satisfied that to permit the conunission
to fix new rates for the purpose of
refunds, as requested by Pacific, would
involve retroactive rate making in
violation of the principles recognized
in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm., supra, 62 Cal.2d 634, 649656, 44 Cal. Reptr. 1, 401 P.2d 353. The
basic conclusion that the rates existing
prior to this proceeding are unreasonable
as well as the conclusion that increases
in rates are justified are both based
on the same defective findings.
To permit
the commission to redetermine whether the
preexisting rates were unreasonable as of
the date of its order and to establish
new rates for the purpose of refunds would
mean that the commission is establishing
rates retroactively rather than prospectively. (emphasis added)
The attempt of the Utah Public Service Commission to amend

its reversed order, and to base retroactive rates on that amendment
is void as a matter of law.
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POINT IV.
FILING A 11 SUSPENDING BOND 11 IS NOT A
PREREQUISITE TO OBTAINING A REFUND OF
REVENUES COLLECTED BY A PUBLIC UTILITY
PURSUANT TO AN INVALID ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.
It was urged before the Public Service Conunission that a
refund could not be granted in this matter because on the original
appeal the Appellants had not filed a "suspending bond."
submitted that the filing of a

11

It is

suspending bond" is not a prerequi-

site to obtaining a refund of revenues paid by customers to a
utility pursuant to an invalid conunission order.

A "suspendinging

bond" must be filed only if a stay order is requested on the
grounds that "great and irreparable damage would . . . result to the
petitioner"· if the stay is not granted.
no bond is required.

If no stay is requested,

This is clearly established by an analysis

of Sections 54-7-16 and 54-7-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as ·
amended.
Section 54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953, provides that an applicant
for a rate increase uor any party to the proceeding deeming himself
aggrieved.

.

.may apply to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari"

to review an order of the Public Service Commission.

However, the

filing of such a writ "does not of itself stay or suspend the
operation of the order."

(54-7-17(1))

Section 54-7-17(2) enunciates the only condition under which
a commission order may be stayed or suspended.

That condition is:

upon evidence submitted to the court.
that great or irreparable damage would otherwise result to the petitioner . . .
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~:

It is apparent that the legislature did not anticipate th~a customer of a public utility would suffer "great or irreparable ~
It

damage" because of an increase in his monthly utility rates.

is equally apparent that it was anticipated that a utility might

~t

suffer such damage if it wer~ to be precluded from collecting

~

millions of dollars in revenue while the legality of an order was

11

being reviewed.
The 1945 case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub.Ser.Com.
155 P. 2d 184 (cited under Point II of this argument) illustrates
the operation of the Utah law.

In that case the order of the

Public Service co~mission h~d reduced the rates that could be
charged by the utility.

The utility appealed the order.

Pending

appeal, and after filing a "suspending bond," the effect of the
order was stayed because of the "great and irreparable damage" the
utility might suffer if it were to lose the revenue occasioned
by the lower rates during the appeal process.

By providing a

"suspending bond," the utility was permitted to collect the full
~cunt

of its rates which were in effect prior to the commission

order rather than the reduced rates required by that order.

How-

ever, the amount the utility collected in excess of the sum a
customer would have been compelled to pay if the order of the
commission had not been stayed was impounded pending a decision
by this court.
The procedure is set forth in Section 17-7-17(3), U.C.A.
1953.

In the event the Supreme Court grants a stay or suspends an,

order, the court "?hall also by order direct the public utility

.,.\.....:
_,_Services
: .._
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collect from any person in excess of the sum such person would
have been compelled to pay, if the order or decision of the
commission had not been stayed or suspended."

This is the only

provision regarding the necessity of a "suspending bond'' in connection with the repayment of revenues collected pursuant to a
commission order under appeal.

The full text of Section 54-7-17(3)

is as follows:
(3)
In case the order or decision of the
commission is stayed or suspended, the order
of the court shall not become effective until
a suspending bond shall first have been executed
and filed with and approved by the commission
(or approved, on review, by the Supreme Court)
payable to the state of Utah, and sufficient
in amount and security to ensure the prompt
payment by the party petitioning for the review
of all damages caused by the delay in the enforcement of the order or decision of the commission, and of all moneys which any person or
corporation may be compelled to pay, pending
the review proceedings, for transportation,
t~ansmission, product_, cow.nodity or service in
excess of the charges fixed by the order or
decision of the commission, in case said order
or decision is sustained. The Supreme Court
in case it stays or suspends the order or
decision of the commission in any matter
affecting rates, fares, tolls, rentals,
charges or classifications, shall also by
order direct the public utility affected to
~into court from time to time, there to be
impounded until the final decision of the
case, or into some bank or trust company paying interest on deposits, under such conditions as the court may prescribe, all sums
of money which it may collect-from any person
in excess of the sum such person would have
been compelled to pay, if the order or
decision of the commission had not been
stayed or suspended.
(emphasis added)
In determining the significance of case law dealing with
utility refunds, the wording of the statutes involved is important.
The wording of Utah and Colorado laws governing such refunds are
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almost identical.

The principle difference is that the Colorado

statute (40-6-116, C.R.S. 1973, formerly 115-6-16, C.R.S. 1963)
places jurisdiction in the district court and the Utah statute
(54-7-17) places jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.

The same

requirements exist as to "suspending bonds."
In the 1972 case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub.
Util. Comm., the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether or not a "suspending bond" was necessary in refund cases.
There the court said (502 P.2d 945,

~49

(Colo. 1972)):

Mountain Bell has emphasized the fact that
the 1969 rate order was not suspended under
bond during appeal, pursuant to C.R.S. 1963,
115-6-16 (amended in 1969) . This statute provides that a party petitioning for review of
a rate order may have the order stayed pending
appeal after a finding that "great or irreparable damage would otherwise result to the
petitioner" and after the party petitioning
for review has filed a suspending bond which
will ensure the prompt payment "of all
damages caused by the delay in the enforcement of the order or decision of the commission."
The original version of 115-6-16 (L. 13, p. 498,
§ 53) is substantially similar to the present
section. This original version was interpreted
in Denver & S.L.R. Co. v. C.B. & Q.R. Co., 67
Colo. 155, 185 P. 817 (1919), to be permissive
only.
It was stated that suspension of a
Commission order was not a mandatory requirement for appellate review of the order, and
that the commission may order restitution in
a proper case. Amendments to the original
version of the statute do not provide any
basis for altering this interpretation. (emph. add.)
It is apparent from the foregoing that a customer of

c.P.

is not required to post a "suspending bond" in order to obtain a
refund of rates paid pursuant to an invalid order of the Public
Service Commission.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT V.
UTILITY CUSTOMERS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION WILL BE VIOLATED IF
THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH THIS
APPEAL AND OBTAIN A REFUND.
A basic concept of law is that statutes are not to be construed so as to discriminate -between the affluent and the poor.
If Section 54-7-17, U.C.A. 1953, is to be construed as requiring
customers of"c.P."to file a "suspending bond" in order to obtain
a refund of rates paid to "C. P ." pursuant to an invalid order of
the Public Service Commission, although a stay of the order is not
requested, the constitutional rights of those customers will have
been violated.
In order to obtain a stay (thus making mandatory the filing
of a "suspending bond") a customer would be required to convince
the court that he would suffer "great or irreparable damage."

(54-7-17(2), U.C.A. 1953)

It is problematical that being required

to pay increased monthly utility rates would constitute "great
or irreparable damage."
However, assuming, arguendo, that "great or irreparable
damage" could be shown by a customer, few would be able to afford
a "suspending bond."

Such a bond would have to be "sufficient in

amount and security to ensure the prompt payment by the party
petitioning for the review of all damages caused by the delay in
the enforcement of the order or decision of the commission, and of
all moneys which any person or corporation may be compelled to pay,
pending review proceedings, for transportation, transmission,
product, commodity or service in excess of the charges fixed by
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the order or decision of the commission, in case said order or
decision is sustained."

(54-7-17(3) U.C.A. 1953)

It is obvious

that the cost of a "suspending bond" to a customer would greatly
exceed any refund of increased monthly rates he might receive.
Such an interpretation would permit an affluent corporation
to obtain relief under the law while denying relief to the
unaffluent.
By virtue of a clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States expressly forbidding it to do
so, a state may not deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

City of St. Petersburg v.

Alsup, 77 S.Ct. 680, 353 U.S. 922.
The fourteenth amendment and laws adopted under its
authority embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in
the United States shall abide in any state on equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.
Takahaski v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138
Various broad and sweeping generalizations and statements
as to the meaning of this important part of the Constitution have
from time to time been enunciated.

The guiding principle most

often stated by the courts is that the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws requires that all persons shall
·be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions.

Hartfo~

Steam Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459,
57

s.ct

838
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With the above principles as the criteria, the argument
is forwarded that a party who cannot afford the bond necessary to
participate in a utility appeal may have been denied both the
equal protection and due process requirements of the law.
It is generally stated that the Constitution is no respector
of the financial status of persons, and the rich and poor alike
are to be accorded equal rights under it.

Moreover the mere

presence of wealth,or lack thereof, in a party or citizen cannot
be the basis for valid discrimination.

Schilbv. Kuebel, 404 U.S.

357, 92 S.Ct. 479; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 3
As to the present case at hand, the practical reality of
mandatorily requiring prompt payment by a petitioning party in a
utility action is a burdensome, onerous and inequitable one and
no rational reason exists to support it.
Under .general laws, the requirement of set filing fees,
set bond fees in state and federal courts and other various
financial obligations for use of the court and administrative
systems is rational and the state may legitimately attempt to
limit its expenditures.

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91

S.Ct. 1848; Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479.

Further

parties using the courts and administrative systems of the state
or federal government should generally be encouraged to assist in
allaying portions of such costs.
93

s.ct.

Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,

1112
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A very different setting and situation arises though when
parties are required to match the costs of a public utilities
organization, which may include expenses of attorneys, accountants,:
management personnel, support staff and countless outside expert
witnesses.

Matching the bill in advance for such an "expedition"

would certainly bankrupt any potential residential consumer or
party engaged in small commercial enterprises in the State of Utah.
As long as the state utilizes the criterion of ability to.
pay as a condition to being allowed to challenge a utility action,
and since there is no rational justification in requiring all
petitioning parties to pay prior to gaining court access, this
court in line with the general

pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme

Court in the cases of Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 3 71, 91 S. Ct.
780; Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.ct. 1315, Griffin v.
Illinois 351 U.S. 958, 76 S.Ct.585, _ Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79
S.Ct. 1164, Gidion v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792,
should conclude that no rational basis exists for mandatorily
requiring parties to obtain a suspending bond if they wish to
challenge the activities of a utility.

This is particularly true

when no stay of an order is requested.
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POINT VI.
FINDINGS OF FACT 4, 5 AND 6 AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE ARBITRARY, UNSUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION.
A.

The Commission merely changed its mind without evi-

dence or justification.
The Comraission, in· the first hearing, had made extensive Findings of Fact in which it clearly held that the Wheeling
Agreement in question had not been submitted to the Commission,
had not been approved and that it was not in the best public interest or in the interest of the customers.

The Supreme Court

commented extensively upon such Findings and concluded that the
Order issued by the Commission was inconsistent with said Findings.
The Commission now, in the Order before this Court in
Finding No. 4, states as the reason for now reversing its extensive Findings made earlier that,
"The reason for the inconsistency is that the Findings did not correctly and completely set forth the
basis for the Commission's Order.
The Report and
Order was inartfully drawn and was hastily issued
under the pressures of a heavy case load of hearings and paper work.
The Commission has carefully
deliberated in determining the decision to be made
in this case."
The Finding of Fact obviously is not supported by any evidence.
The only evidence supporting any Findings was given at the original hearings and was the foundation for the extensive Findings
to the effect that the Agreement and thus the increased costs
were not in the public interest nor in the interest of the consumers of Cal-Pac, i.e. the ·Protestants herein.

Such a Finding

now with the Order affirming same on appeal is thus arbitrary
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without any evidence to support same.

Without any proper evi-

dence, the Findings and Conclusions of Law simply deprive Protestants of the Findings to which Protestants are entitled and
which are necessary under the procedures and under the Constitution of the State of Utah governing such cases.

Logan City

vs. Public Utilities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac. 1006.
B.

The Commission's Findings and Order violate the

intent of the Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court, in its prior decision on this matter, clearly intended that the Cornmission would abide by its
Findings and would make the Conclusions and Order consistent
therewith.

Several factors lead us to this conclusion.
1.

Section 54-7-16 provides,

"The Findings and Conclusions of the Commission
on questions of fact shall be final and shall not
be subject to review.
Such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission on reasonableness and discrimination •.•••
Upon the hearing, the Supreme
Court shall enter judgment either affirming or
setting aside the Order or decision of the Commission •.•.•• "
It is abundantly clear from the detail examination of the Cornmission's Findings by this Court that there was no intent whatsoever to disturb said Findings.

The Findings were clear and

were amply supported by the evidence.

The Supreme Court simply

did not intend to reverse the Findings, and in fact, would not
attempt to do this under the statute and under the many cases
previously handed down by this Court.

Bamburger Electric Rail-

road Company vs. Public Utilities Commission, 59 Utah 351, 204
Pac. 314; Utah Light and Transit Company vs. Public Service Co!!!:_
mission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 and more recently Greyhound
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2.

The language in the Supreme Court Order is

clear in evidencing the intent to make the Commission Order
conform to the Findings - and not to make the Findings confo_rm
to the Order.

After reciting its approval of the detailed

Findings of Fact, the Supreme Court stated,
"In its Order, the-Commission nevertheless granted
53.03% of the requested increase and ordered CalPac to negotiate with the Bureau for an increase
in the Wheeling rate ....•
The Commission's Order is not supported by its
Findings, and in fact is hostile to them.
The
Findings and Order are irreconcilable and that
irreconcilability is fatal.
The Commission found
that the U P & L contract was not in the public
interest, but based a rate increase on the terms
of that contract."
The Supreme Court then invited the Comrnisson to
hold further hearings if necessary to achieve the harmonious
relationship between the Findings and Order.
The language seems clear that the Supreme Court
intended that the Order be changed to fit the Findings.

Any

contrary intent would have to have been made upon some deter. mination that the Findings of the Commission were arbitrary or
capricious and are not supported by the evidence whatsoever.
Obviously, such a decision was not made by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, it is clear that the Commission did not
follow the mandate of the Supreme Court in changing the Order
to fit the Findings, but to the contrary modified the Findings,
without any additional evidence, to fit the Order.

Such action

on the part of the Commission is arbitrary and without any rational basis whatsoever.

The Commission's Findings thus made

without proper evidence and based only upon its statement that
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it was hurried into making a prior Finding is not a proper
basis for depriving the Protestants of their rights and imposing the additional assessments upon them.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons which have been set forth above, Appellants urge this Court to reverse the Report and Order of the
Commission authorizing the appropriate refund of all payments
made under the prior ruling of the Commission and reversing the
Order of the Commission to make it consistent with the Findings
of Fact previously made to the effect that the contract with
Utah Power and Light was not in the public interest and could
not, therefore, be the basis for a rate increase.
The action of the Commission in its Report and Order
here under review is not only inconsistent with the statutes,.
but is clearly arbitrary and deprives the consumers of their
property rights without a proper evidentiary hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

cZ)"~day of~

1980.

am s L. B
er
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Committee of Consumer
Services

El
tt Lee
CLYDE & PRATT
Attorney for Protestants, Plaintiffs herein
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